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SOCIAL CONSTRAINT OR IMPLICIT
COLLUSION?: TOWARD A GAME THEORETIC
ANALYSIS OF STARE DECISIS
Erin O'Hara*
I. INTRODUCTION
For well over a century, legal scholars have focused their atten-
tion on legal precedent and stare decisis1 a rule which purportedly
requires judges to decide new cases in accord with relevant preex-
isting precedent.2 Despite an extensive and rich literature on the
social costs and benefits of stare decisis,3 no scholar has satisfactorily
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1 See, e.g.,JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 148-58 (6th ed. 1949); KN.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, ON OUR LAW AND ITs STUDY 59-76 (195 1); RICHARD A.
WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 39-83 (1961);Jan G. Deutsch, Precedent and Ad-
judication, 83 YALE L.J. 1552 (1974); Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law:
On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules, 15J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986); Earl Maltz,
The Nature Of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367 (1988); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39
STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theoy of Stare Decisis, I J. LEGAL
STUD. 125 (1972).
2 Harry W. Jones, Dyson Distinguished Lecture: Precedent and Policy in Constitutional
Law, 4 PACE L. REv. 11, 18 (1983). Stare decisis is the short form of "stare decisis et non
quieta movere [which means] stand by the past decisions, and do not disturb settled
things." Id. Stare decisis also involves following a precedent even though the previous
decision may be wrong or at odds with the current judge's views. See Schauer, supra
note 1, at 576; WASSERSTROM, supra note 1, at 54; Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Deci-
sis: Concerning Prajudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 199, 200 (1933). One
author has commented that:
If a court follows a previous decision, because a revered master has ut-
tered it, because it is the right decision, because it is logical, because it is
just, because it accords with the weight of authority, because it has been
generally accepted and acted on, because it secures a beneficial result to
the community, that is not an application of stare decisis. To make the
act such an application, the previous decision must be followed because
it is a previous decision and for no other reason ....
Id.
3 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Lawrence E. Blume
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal Process, I IJ. LEGAL STUD. 405 (1982);
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answered an important preliminary question: Why would any ra-
tional judge willingly limit her own discretion by following
precedents?
The common legal assumption, that the doctrine of stare decisis
is a rule society has imposed on the judiciary,4 is unsatisfying for
several reasons. First, in most stare decisisjurisdictions, no law man-
dates the rule.5 Second, because most people know little about
judges' decision-making, they are poor guardians of stare decisis. Fi-
nally, federal judges with life tenure and guaranteed salaries follow
stare decisis even though they are largely insulated from societal
pressures.
Richard Higgins and Paul Rubin attempted to link stare decisis
to external political pressures.6 They posited that judges follow
precedents to maximize the likelihood that they will be promoted
to higher paying positions. When they tested a major implication
of their hypothesis-that older judges would be less constrained
than younger judges-by observing the decision-making behavior
of United States District Court judges in the Eighth Circuit, they
found no supporting evidence.7
This Article suggests an alternative, internal rationale for why
judges follow precedents. The Article posits that stare decisis has
evolved as a result of judges' preference for the doctrine.8 The
William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1949); Herman Oliphant, A
Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71 (1928); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U.S. 405 (1931).
The primary social cost of stare decisis is the entrenchment of bad decisions. The
social benefits of the doctrine fall into three categories: (1) certainty and predictabil-
ity; (2) fairness or consistency; and, (3) judicial efficiency. See, e.g., ARTHUR
GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE, THE WARREN COURT ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT 72-76
(1971);John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 2
(1983). The magnitude of both the costs and the benefits will depend on how effec-
tively judicial decision-making is constrained.
4 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them .... "); Jones, supra
note 2, at 26.
5 Michigan may be an exception to this rule. Prompted by social disapproval of
inconsistent decisions by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme
Court entered an order which provided that a panel of the Court of Appeals must
follow prior Court of Appeals decisions. See generally Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Within
Michigan's Court of Appeals: Precedential Effect of its Decisions on the Court Itself and on
Michigan Trial Courts, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 265 (1991).
6 Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129,
130-31 (1980).
7 Id. at 137-38.
8 In contrast, at least one commentator views the emergence of stare decisis in the
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Article begins with an assumption that judges are primarily moti-
vated by a desire to impose their normative views, beliefs, and mo-
res on the society in which they live. Using simple tools from game
theory, it shows that where judges' normative views differ, an agree-
ment to follow each other's precedents eliminates nonproductive
competition that would result ifjudges were unconstrained in their
efforts to have their own, rather than other judges', normative
views define the legal consequences of individual behavior. As a
result, judges are better off under a rule of stare decisis. This Article
also considers what a stare decisis agreement might entail and how
tacit collusion by judges might survive over time. Although the
model presented is abstract and somewhat unrealistic (because it
peels away much of the detail of judicial decision-making), this Ar-
ticle attempts to expose a nugget of truth about the evolution and
persistence of stare decisis. Finally, the informal model predicts
some specific phenomena found in our legal systems and is, to
some extent, empirically testable.
II. IN THE BEGINNING: WHY JUDGES WOULD AGREE TO BE
BOUND BY OTHER JUDGES' DECISIONS
Imagine a society that has grown large enough to need a for-
mal legal structure to enforce behavioral norms and settle disputes
between individuals in the society. Ajudiciary is formed, consisting
of a number of trial court judges who decide cases that arise. A
party dissatisfied with the trial outcome can appeal to appellate
judges for review. To discuss the basic trade-off an appellate judge
confronts during the decision-making process, suppose initially
that one judge is appointed to decide all appeals.
A. One Judge Decides All Appeals
This Article assumes not only that the appellate judge is ra-
tional, but also that he will be motivated primarily by a desire to
impose his normative views on the society in which he lives.9 That
United States as a mere adherence to English tradition which the judges and observ-
ers took for granted. See Jones, supra note 2, at 17 (asserting that early American
judges reasoned by reference to precedent simply because it was ingrained in them by
their training and experience).
9 William Landes and Richard Posner suggested this motivation several years ago.
Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 272-73. They submitted that:
the independent judge derives utility by imposing his policy preferences
on the community. This approach, which is broadly consistent with the
ordinary assumptions of self-interested behavior employed in economic
analysis, is helpful in explaining why ajudge might want to create prece-
738 [Vol. 24:736
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is, while deciding appeals, the judge prefers that society reflect his
own normative views, beliefs, and mores. Perhaps he can not al-
ways effectuate perfectly his notion of the "Good Society,"'" but he
will, where possible, make decisions according to his own norma-
tive views. Even a judge who truly believes he is simply making the
"best" decisions for society will evaluate the legal options by com-
paring the extent to which they each reflect his own values."
In making his decisions, the appellate judge affects individual
behavior because he defines the legal consequences of particular
actions. He also affects the decisions of lower court judges pro-
vided he can make it costly for them to contravene his decisions.'"
Consequently, a self-interested judge who faced no opportunity
costs would maximize his expected positive influence on societal
behavior, where "positive" means that the outcome of the cases ac-
cord with his own normative views.
Normally, however, a judge's resources, such as time, are lim-
ited. That is, the more time he invests gathering information,
thinking about the optimal decision, and writing an opinion suffi-
ciently unambiguous to clearly affect behavior,'" the longer the pe-
dents rather than just resolve disputes: to the extent it is followed in
subsequent decisions, the precedent will affect more behavior.
Id.
10 For example, the judge's normative views might differ so drastically from the
values of other citizens that he will be removed from office or will be unable to en-
force his decisions. Moreover, an appellate judge may face considerable legislative
and constitutional restraints. Additionally, competition with other methods of dis-
pute resolution may force him to take prevailing societal norms into account. See
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL S-ruD. 235 (1979) (discussing public court competition with private adjudica-
tion and non-adjudicative substitutes); see also Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Pri-
vate and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107 (1983).
11 I am not making a normative statement here. An example of such a normative
statement is found in BENJAmIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADoxEs OF LEGAL SCIENCE 55
(Greenwood Press 1970) ("Ajudge is to give effect in general not to his own scale of
values, but to the scale of values revealed to him in his readings of the social mind.").
I am merely asserting that regardless of how a judge should make his decisions, he
nevertheless desires a legal rule which reflects his personal values.
12 One way to impose costs on a lower court judge is to remand a case to that
judge. By contravening the appellate judge's decision, the lower court judge must do
more work and does not successfully achieve a different outcome. Additionally, the
appellate judge can humiliate the lower court judge by writing a scathing opinion
when he reverses and remands. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 525, 544, 547, 549, 550, 553, 554
(1978) (alleging that a decision byJudge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit "seriously mis-
read," was a "serious departure" from, and "fundamentally misconceive [d]" a very ba-
sic tenet of administrative law which the Supreme Court had previously made
abundantly clear and explicit).
13 For an example of the need to write clear opinions in the administrative law
HeinOnline  -- 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 739 1993-1994
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riod of time before he affects behavior with respect to issues raised
in other pending cases. 14 This represents an opportunity cost to
the judge, because he would presumably prefer people to behave
according to his normative views sooner.' 5 Consequently, the pres-
ent value of having society behave favorably decreases as the period
of time before imposition of his normative views increases.
With only one judge deciding appeals, we expect a relatively
certain and predictable legal system.16 Two considerations contrib-
ute to this result. First, the judge will be deciding cases in accord
with his previous rulings in much the same way that many drivers
unfailingly stop at red lights even at three o'clock in the morning.
Just as the driver prefers to be detained for a few moments rather
than think about whether there are police cars in the vicinity, the
judge prefers not to think through a legal issue every time it arises
in his courtroom. Indeed, he prefers not to re-litigate the issue
even though there is some probability that he initially decided the
issue "incorrectly," in the sense that the initial determination fails
to further his normative views effectively.
The second reason to expect a relatively certain and predict-
able legal system is that ajudge often prefers to write opinions stat-
ing the legal consequences of a broader range of behavior than
that involved in a particular case. In this way he can influence a
broader range of activities with each opinion. Assume, however,
that within this system there is an external constraint upon the
breadth of the judge's opinion somewhat akin to the case or con-
troversy requirement of Article III courts in the United States. 7
More specifically, assume the judge can only decide those issues
context, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
67 (1983) (enumerating that a rational rulemaker will (1) "want to use words with
well-defined and universally accepted meanings within the relevant community"; (2)
want his rules to be "applicable to concrete situations without excessive difficulty or
effort"; and, (3) "care about whether the substantive content of his message produces
the desired behavior").
14 In the model set out below, every party unsatisfied with the trial court's judg-
ment has a right of appeal and the make-up of the appellate bench is stable. If, in-
stead, the judge had discretion not to hear appeals or the appellate bench were
expanded because of congestion, then spending more time deciding each case might
mean that the judge will hear fewer appeals. His net ability to impose his normative
views would then be reduced.
15 In addition, the judge enjoys leisure, another opportunity cost. At some point
the judge derives greater utility from non-professional activities than from influencing
additional aspects of his society's behavior.
16 Of course, this certainty and predictability will depend on the judge's
consistency.
17 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
740 [Vol. 24:736
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that arise in the dispute before the court."8 For example, the judge
will be precluded from enunciating principles of patent law in an
appeal of a bankruptcy case which does not involve a patent
dispute.
Even within this external constraint, the judge faces a trade-
off. The judge's principal goal is to influence behavior, and the
broader the language of his opinion the wider the range of behav-
ior he can influence with it. The problem, however, is that the
broader his opinion, the greater the likelihood that he is including
fact situations in his opinion that he would prefer to exclude. 19 In
other words, he increases the likelihood of creating incentives for
members of society to behave in ways which are actually contrary to
his normative views.2" Although the judge can later abandon that
part of his opinion which creates undesirable incentives, he prefers
to avoid encouraging such behavior in the interim.2 1
For this reason, once the judge has determined the breadth of
his opinion, he has an incentive to carve out some narrower por-
tion of the opinion as his holding. While the opinion as a whole
indicates how he might later rule in future cases raising a similar
issue, the judge's holding indicates how he will in fact decide those
cases which fall within his holding. When these cases are appealed,
18 In the federal court context, see GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONsTmrrIONAL LAW
76 (1986) (stating that case or controversy requirement is intended to ensure that
issues will be "resolved only in the context of concrete disputes, rather than in re-
sponse to problems that may be hypothetical, abstract, or speculative"). The case or
controversy requirement was first implicated by the Supreme Court in Marbuy v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (declaring that Article III implies that the
Constitution and laws are to be evaluated in the context of the particular case). It has
been argued, however, that a broad reading of Marbury supports at least constitutional
adjudication as a special function of the Court rather than merely as an "incidental
byproduct" of private litigation. GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw 1606 (10th ed. 1980). Nevertheless, for purposes of the model, the
external limitation will preclude the determination of issues which do not arise in the
dispute.
19 For example, if the judge asserts that free speech is so important that all por-
nography is to be legally protected, then child pornographers will interpret his opin-
ion to mean that they are protected as well, even though the judge would have child
pornographers punished.
20 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 3, at 262 ("The more (efficiently) precise and
detailed the applicable substantive standard or rule is, the higher is the probability
that the activity will be deemed illegal if it is in fact undesirable ... and the lower is
the probability that the activity will be deemed illegal if it is in fact desirable.").
21 This is especially true for risk averse individuals who will invest greater resources
to avoid unfavorable legal consequences indicated by the judge's opinion. Id. If the
judge thinks there is a fine line between undesirable and desirable activities, he may
want to write a narrow opinion to avoid deterring desirable behavior. If the opinion is
too narrow to include such behavior, individuals are less likely to invest these addi-
tional resources to avoid legal consequences that the judge will not actually impose.
1993]
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the judge will apply his holding rather than re-litigate the issue,
absent some substantial indication that the holding is "incorrect."
As a result, fewer litigants will bring appeals.22 Here, too, the judge
faces a trade-off. On the one hand, he prefers to make his holding
broader to discourage as many appeals as possible. On the other
hand, however, he prefers not to commit himself to a particular
ruling as the facts of future cases become less and less similar to the
facts of the present case.23
Thus, when one judge decides all appeals, he will write opin-
ions to maximize his influence on societal behavior net of at least
temporary costs of over-inclusion and the opportunity costs of in-
vestment in writing carefully decided opinions. In addition, the
legal consequences of behavior treated in the judge's holdings will
change only when one of two situations results. 24 First, the judge
may believe there is a significant probability that he decided the
previous case or delineated the scope of the holding "incorrectly."
Second, social, economic, or technological changes may have ren-
dered the judge's precedent obsolete. 25 In either case, the subjec-
tive probability that a change in the prevailing legal rule is needed
must be high enough to compel the judge to invest the effort nec-
essary to reconsider the issue. In short, the effect of the judge's
decision-making is an imperfect stare decisis.216 The judge will follow
his own holdings until there is a sufficiently high probability that a
holding should be modified or replaced. 7 In addition, the nature
22 Assuming, of course, that the judge can enforce his own precedents by making
it costly for the lower courts to ignore or reject them.
23 The acuteness of this trade-off will vary across issues. Some issues lend them-
selves to general rules, while others are more appropriately decided via ad hoc deci-
sion-making. Because the judge wishes to minimize the costs of over-inclusion, he is
likely to formulate a more narrow rule or standard where the costs of over-inclusion
are high. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 3, at 271 (suggesting that if particular legal
conduct is not considered socially very valuable, then the costs of over-inclusion will
decrease). Moreover, the problems of over-inclusion increase as the heterogeneity of
the conduct intended to be affected becomes greater. Id. at 270.
24 Of course, individuals do not always know the legal consequences of their ac-
tions. Rather, the more closely contemplated behavior resembles the previous facts,
the better they can predict the legal consequences of that behavior.
25 Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 268-69. Landes and Posner analogize prece-
dent to capital stocks. Id. Like other forms of capital, a precedent tends to depreciate
with social, economic, and technological changes. At some point, the old precedent
becomes obsolete and should be replaced. Id.
26 I use the term imperfect stare decsis because the judge does not inevitably follow
his own precedents forever. Following the same precedent, no matter what, would be
perfect stare decisis and would not characterize the judge's behavior unless the society
could both impose and enforce a rule of perfect stare decisis.
27 The judge will reconsider the holding if the expected benefits of re-litigating
are greater than the expected costs of re-litigation. The expected benefits are
742 [Vol. 24:736
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of the judge's preferences will generate a natural limitation on the
breadth of both his opinions and his holdings.
28
B. Two Judges Decide All Appeals Without Agreement: The Problem of
Nonproductive Competition
Now that the basic trade-offs inherent in a judge's decision-
making have been identified, the model can be extended to in-
clude tensions that an appellate judge confronts when interacting
with other appellate judges. For simplicity, assume that the appel-
late court is expanded to two judges, Ann and Bert, with equal and
independent authority to decide appeals. Assume also that each
judge serves on the court in perpetuity. Each case is randomly as-
signed to one of the judges, so that each judge has a one-half
probability of deciding each appeal. What can be said about their
interaction?
First, if Ann and Bert shared perfectly identical normative
views, then the legal system would function consistently with a rule
of stare decisis. Bert would always follow Ann's precedents because
he would have formulated the same precedent if initially given the
opportunity. Thus, although the rationale for following Ann's
precedents would not be the same (Bert is not following the prece-
dents merely because they came before), the desired effects of stare
decisis would be achieved.29 Indeed, if the two judges shared per-
fectly identical views, the appellate court would function as though
only one judge decided appeals.
It follows that even if the judges disagreed about some legal
issues, where Ann and Bert in fact agreed, the effects of stare decisis
will be obtained. That is, where Ann thought that Bert's previously
generated rule is correct because it affirms her own normative
views, she will ratify it in her own decisions.
In addition, some specialization should increase judicial effi-
ciency. For example, if Bert is more knowledgeable about patent
law, Ann may decide to follow his patent decisions. In addition, if
Ann knows more about bankruptcy, Bert may decide to follow her
equivalent to the expected value of the judge's increased ability to incorporate his
normative views into the legal system multiplied by his subjective probability that a
change in the legal rule will result in an improved incorporation of his normative
views. The expected costs of re-litigation include the opportunity costs to the judge of
the increased effort necessary to change the governing legal rule.
28 The judge's opinion and holding are presented more formally in Part IV A.
29 Here, too, stare decisis is imperfect because the judges may later modify or re-
place their precedents. If their views are identical, then both would support the
change.
7431993]
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decisions. Specialization can be predicted when the benefits to a
judge from influencing behavior in a particular realm, minus the
investment costs of technical expertise, are lower than the benefits
she obtains from influencing other behavior.30 When this is true, a
judge may defer to ajudge with greater technical expertise (or one
who derives greater benefits from influencing that behavior).
Thus, to the extent specialization evolves or the judges' normative
views coincide, some judicial efficiency results even without an
agreement between the appellate judges to follow each other's
precedents.
Where their normative views differ without specialization,
however, the judges will engage in nonproductive competition. To
illustrate, suppose that in period 1 Ann and Bert each decide one
case, each presenting a single issue for determination. Assume that
deciding an "issue" means that each opinion a judge writes in ef-
fect decides the same number of cases or disputes, and that the
judges are equally concerned about the disposition of each issue.
Suppose further that each judge disagrees with the other's prece-
dent. Neither judge will follow the other's decision because each
prefers to impose his own normative views instead.
Over the course of several periods, additional issues will gener-
ate disagreement between the judges. Each of these issues could
be represented by one box in a "grid of disagreement." If an issue
is decided according to Ann's normative views, then the box will
contain an X. Conversely, if the issue is decided according to
Bert's normative views, then the box will contain an 0. Ann pre-
fers that each of the boxes in the grid be covered with an X, for
then the legal system perfectly reflects her normative views. For
the same reason, Bert prefers that each of the boxes in the grid be
covered with an 0. Consequently, when these issues again arise in
appeals assigned to Ann, she will replace Bert's O's with X's. When
Bert is assigned appeals implicating these issues, he will replace
Ann's X's with O's.
This behavior will continue ad nauseam, with the net result that
neither Ann nor Bert is any better at influencing behavior. Fifty
percent of the cases raising issues over which they disagree will be
decided with an X, according to Ann's normative views, and the
other fifty percent will be decided with an 0, according to Bert's
normative views. At the same time, Ann and Bert will be expend-
ing effort hearing and deciding these cases as they compete against
30 Alternatively, the judges might trade types of cases (e.g., patent for bankruptcy)
if they were permitted to communicate and trade appeals.
744 [Vol. 24:736
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each other in a race to place more X's or O's on the grid. Thus,
with no agreement between the judges limiting their discretion,
their interaction would be plagued with nonproductive
competition.
This nonproductive competition generates two predictions.
First, the trial judges' decisions will be unconstrained, for no one
rule governs these issues. Trialjudges can defensibly choose to fol-
low either Ann's or Bert's rules. Second, nonproductive competi-
tion will create many appeals. That is, parties have an incentive to
raise these issues at the trial level, and, not knowing ex ante which
judges will hear their appeal, losing parties have every incentive to
subsequently use these issues as the basis for an appeal. These los-
ing parties will always have a 50-50 chance of ultimately winning
their cases on appeal. The judges' desire to reduce appeals by
eliminating the nonproductive competition drives the remaining
analysis.
C. Avoiding Nonproductive Competition
By agreeing to follow each other's precedents, the judges
could eliminate this nonproductive competition. 1 If the judges'
agreement was perfectly and costlessly enforced, the judges would
both be better off. Under such an agreement, each appellate
judge would maintain the same net effect on societal behavior.
Although Ann may write fewer precedent-setting opinions than
Bert during a given day or week, over several periods the law of
large numbers predicts that Ann and Bert will each set the same
number of precedents. Because the model assumes that each pre-
cedent-setting opinion decides the same number of cases or dis-
putes, setting an equal number of precedents implies that Ann's
normative views will decide the same number of cases as will Bert's
normative views. 32 Thus, although they have limited their own in-
31 The model differs fundamentally from Lewis Kornhauser's work on judicial de-
cision-making because it adopts a rule-bound rather than a result-bound approach to
adjudication. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modelling Collegial Courts I: Path Dependence, 12
INrr'L Rsv. L. & EcON. 169 (1992); Lewis A. Kornauser, Modelling Collegial Courts. 1I.
Legal Doctrine, 8 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992). For purposes of the model in this
Article, a precedent will include both the holding or rule presented in an opinion, as
well as the language of the opinion itself. For reasons which will become apparent
later, only the holding will be binding on ajudge in the sense that declining to follow
it will be considered a violation of stare decisis. The non-binding language constitutes
persuasive precedent: it states an argument for applying particular legal conse-
quences to behavior not covered by the holding. Ajudge failing to follow this "dicta,"
however, will not suffer any negative consequences from his colleagues.
32 The assumption that each precedent-setting opinion decides the same number
1993] 745
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dividual discretion, fifty percent of the cases and precedents would
still be decided according to each judge's normative views.33
By eliminating nonproductive competition, not only is neither
judge any worse off in his ability to impose his normative views on
society, but the judges can lighten their workload. First, with only
one rule governing each issue, fewer disputes will arise because
members of society will adjust their behavior to avoid litigation
costs and legal consequences. Second, where disputes do arise, ad-
versaries are more likely to settle because the expected legal result
is more certain. 4 Third, assuming that it is costly for a lower court
judge to contravene a clear precedent,35 the lower courts will be
constrained to make rulings consistent with the governing prece-
dents. Finally, where cases are fully litigated at the trial court level,
losing parties will bring fewer appeals because the appellate judges
will be constrained by the same rules governing the lower court's
rulings.
When a losing party nevertheless appeals a trial court ruling
concerning an issue governed by appellate court precedent, the
appellate judge saves time in yet another way. Instead of expend-
ing effort attempting to implement that legal rule which will best
effectuate his own normative views, he simply applies the existing
precedent. Because the litigant who stands to gain from applica-
of cases or disputes is unrealistic and was imposed merely to facilitate the exposition.
The number of cases or disputes that are governed by a precedent will depend both
on the breadth of the precedent set and the frequency of the behavior addressed by
the precedent. The law of large numbers, however, predicts that even though a single
precedent-setting opinion written by Ann may decide more cases or disputes than a
single precedent-setting opinion written by Bert, over several periods Ann's prece-
dent-setting opinions will, on average, decide the same number of cases or disputes as
will Bert's precedent-setting opinions.
33 Of course, the assumption that the judges are equally concerned about the out-
come of each issue is also unrealistic. In any given month Ann may write precedent-
setting opinions governing only issues about which she is not particularly concerned,
whereas Bert may write several precedent-setting opinions about which she cares very
much. Here too, however, the law of large numbers predicts that over several periods
Ann will decide just as many issues about which she cares strongly as she will forfeit to
Bert under their agreement. Bert will also decide as many issues about which he cares
strongly as he will end up forfeiting to Ann.
In addition, if the judges can communicate, either directly or through their law
clerks, then they can logroll. To illustrate, if Bert cares strongly about an issue which
Ann is deciding and Ann cares strongly about an issue which Bert is deciding, each
could agree to write an opinion favorable to the other's normative views.
34 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach To Legal Procedure And Judicial Ad-
ministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 450 (1973) (uncertain legal liability raises settle-
ment costs and therefore lowers the settlement rate).
35 See infra Part V for a discussion of the consequences attendant to contravening a
higher judge's ruling.
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tion of the governing precedent thereby has an incentive to call it
to the judge's attention, the judge's task is made even easier.
This increased efficiency 6 benefits the judges in two ways.
Not only will the judges have more time for non-judicial activities,
but each judge will also maximize his influence. To explain, if
nonproductive competition leads to more appeals, then more
judges may be appointed to absorb the increased case load. Each
judge would then decide only one-third or fewer of the appeals,
compared to the fifty percent decided when the appellate court
consisted of two judges. Consequently, each judge maximizes his
own future influence with a mutual agreement to be constrained
by the other's precedents.3 7
Moreover, the incentive to form an agreement, if perfectly and
costlessly enforced, 8 is present almost regardless of the degree to
which the appellate judges' normative views differ. For example, if
Ann and Bert only disagree occasionally as to the appropriate de-
termination of legal issues raised on appeal, they would still save
time by eliminating the nonproductive competition. In addition,
they would each maintain the same net ability to incorporate their
normative views into the legal system. Indeed, the total obtainable
benefits to such an agreement will be greater the more often the
judges disagree because stare decisis will enable the judges to save
more time and eliminate the need for more appellate judges. In
other words, the more often the judges disagree, the greater the
proportion of their time the judges spend engaging in nonproduc-
tive competition, and the greater the gains from its effective
elimination. 9
36 The term "efficiency" as used in this Article differs from the traditional notion
of social "efficiency." Here the term "efficiency" as applied to courts involves a con-
cern for clearing court dockets, rather than a concern for saving taxpayers' money or
generating higher quality legal decisions. Nevertheless, these latter concerns are fully
consistent with the theory presented, and their presence would enhance the judges'
incentives to implement stare decisis.
37 Stare decisis also creates greater fairness, consistency, certainty and predictability
in the legal system. To the extent the judges favor these attributes (i.e. they want to
live in a relatively certain, predictable and fair society), the agreement will produce
additional benefits for them.
38 If enforcement is costly, rational judges who do not share perfectly identical
normative views might nevertheless reject stare decisis. For example, if the judges
rarely disagree, then the enforcement costs may exceed the benefits derivable from
the agreement. If so, they may prefer the small amount of nonproductive competi-
tion which exists without an agreement to the costs of forming and enforcing an
agreement.
39 The judges would have no incentive to form an agreement only in the extreme
case where they share perfectly identical normative views. Because nonproductive
competition would be absent from their interaction, they might obtain the benefits of
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Until now it has been assumed that judges can form an agree-
ment that is perfectly and costlessly enforced. "Real world" agree-
ments, however, are neither perfectly nor costlessly enforced. In
fact, when our two judges attempt to form such an agreement, a
Prisoner's Dilemma situation results. The next Part will explain
this strategic dilemma and consider a resolution.
III. PRISONER'S DILEMMA ASPECTS OF STARE DEcIsis
The inherent tension associated with the judges' agreement
can be described as a simple Prisoner's Dilemma game.40 Each
judge benefits from an agreement that preserves his net ability to
impose his normative views on society while eliminating non-
productive competition. Each would ultimately prefer, however,
that the otherjudge follow his precedents without he himself being
bound to follow the other's precedents. Of course, every agree-
ment contemplating a mutual exchange can be analyzed as a Pris-
oner's Dilemma situation. Usually the temptation to cheat on the
agreement can be resolved by court enforcement of contracts. The
problem at hand is unusual because we have assumed that the
courts themselves adopt stare decisis. Because a judge could hardly
be expected to enforce an agreement against himself, the usual
threat to ensure performance is largely unavailable. Nevertheless,
the literature on trigger strategies for effective cartel enforcement
is instructive for stare decisis, which can be viewed as a tacit collusion
problem.
A. The Judges' Prisoner's Dilemma
The temptation to ignore or distinguish each other's prece-
stare decisis without forming an agreement. The judges might nevertheless adopt stare
dec/sis in order to discourage the appeals of those litigants who are unaware that the
judges' normative views are identical.
40 This Article assumes the reader is familiar with the story of the Prisoner's Di-
lemma as well as the formal requisites of the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm. For a
history of the invention of the Prisoner's Dilemma story, see Philip D. Straffin,Jr., The
Prisoners Dilemma, 1 U.M.A.P.JoURNAL 101 (1980). For a basic treatment of the Pris-
oner's Dilemma paradigm, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984); CHARLESJ. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 8-35 (1984);
Emc RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 27-30
(1989). For general discussions, see R. DUNCAN LUCE & HowARD RAiFFA, GAMES AND
DECISIONS 94-102 (1967); ANATOL RAPPAPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DI-
LEMMA, A STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1965); ANATOL RAPPAPORT, N-PERSON
GAME THEORY, CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS (1970). For an application of the Pris-
oner's Dilemma in a specific legal context, see Robert L. Birmingham, Legal and Moral
Duty in Game Theory: Common Law Contract and Chinese Analogies, 18 BUFF. L. REv. 99,
105-10 (1968).
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dents creates a risk that stare decisis will unravel. To illustrate, imag-
ine a simple game whereby Ann and Bert each must choose
whether to "cooperate" by following the otherjudge's precedent or
to "defect" by either distinguishing or refusing to follow the other
judge's precedent when that precedent clearly governs the issue
and facts in an appeal. Imagine also that the payoffs to each judge
from his decision are as shown in Figure 1 below. The payoffs in-
clude the judge's satisfaction derived from imposing his normative
views on society, as well as the offsetting disutility associated with
nonproductive competition and the increased effort involved in
formulating a second, conflicting rule. The judges' payoffs are in-
terdependent. That is, Ann's utility is determined not only by
whether Ann herself chooses to follow Bert's precedent but also by
whether Bert has chosen to follow her precedent.
ANN
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (10, 10) (12, 3)
BERT
Defect (3, 12) (5, 5)
Payoffs (Ann, Bert)
FIGURE 1
For example, suppose that in Period 1 Ann wrote an opinion rec-
ognizing a woman's right to an abortion, and Bert wrote an opinion
recognizing the right to burn flags as protected political speech. In
Period 2 Bert is assigned an abortion case, while Ann is assigned a flag
burning case. Bert does not approve of abortions and Ann does not
approve of flag burning. Suppose further that a judge receives a pay-
off of 10 utils if his precedent is followed, while the judge who follows
a precedent receives a payoff of 0. If his precedent is not followed,
then each judge could receive a payoff of 5 utils. That is, each judge
decides fifty percent of the cases according to his own normative
views, so the payoff is split in half and enjoyed equally. Suppose, how-
ever, that each judge incurs a cost of 2 utils when a precedent is not
followed, representing the costs of deciding an additional number of
appeals resulting from inconsistency. Moreover, suppose the defect-
ing judge incurs a cost of 1 util to formulate the second, conflicting
rule.
Notice in Figure 1 that the combined utility for the judges is high-
est when both cooperate (i.e. follow each other's precedents). They
each receive 10 utils because each of their precedents is followed, so
the combined payoff is 20. In contrast, if one judge defects, the com-
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bined payoff is only 15. To illustrate, suppose Bert defects by rejecting
a woman's right to have an abortion while Ann cooperates by protect-
ing flag burning. Bert receives a payoff of 12 utils (10 utils because his
precedent is followed, plus 5 utils for ignoring Ann's precedent, mi-
nus 3 utils because more litigants will appeal cases concerning the
abortion issue and he must write the conflicting precedent). Ann re-
ceives a payoff of 3 utils (0 utils for following Bert's precedent, plus 5
utils because her precedent was ignored, minus 2 utils because more
litigants will appeal cases concerning the abortion issue). If both
judges defect by ignoring each other's precedent, then the combined
payoff is only 10. Each judge receives a payoff of 5 utils (5 utils be-
cause he violated the precedent, plus 5 utils because his precedent was
ignored, minus 4 utils because more litigants will appeal both issues,
minus 1 util because he must write a defecting opinion). Note that
the only force contributing to the smaller payoffs from mutual defec-
tion is the added effort involved in nonproductive competition and in
formulating a second, conflicting rule. Mutual cooperation is not sta-
ble, however, for each judge is made better off in any single interac-
tion by defecting. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by a payoff of 12
rather than 10.
While the numbers chosen to represent the payoffs in Figure 1
are purely fictional, their relationship to one another does reflect the
inherent tension faced by judges who agree to follow each other's
precedents. Without an agreement, each judge on average decides
fifty percent of the cases in which either the abortion or flag burning
issue is raised, but there is nonproductive competition. Thus, not
only must both judges invest the extra effort necessary to formulate a
legal rule, but the fact that their formulated rules conflict also means
the judges must decide these issues repeatedly. They will incur the
cost of wasteful competition both now and in the future. With a per-
fectly enforced agreement, Bert's precedent governs the flag burning
issue, while Ann's precedent governs the abortion issue, and the two
judges save time because the number of appeals is reduced.
Suppose instead that Bert exploits Ann's willingness to abide by
the agreement. Bert's precedent would still govern the flag burning
issue, so the legal system would clearly reflect his normative views with
respect to this issue. Bert might ignore Ann's abortion precedent,
however, and decide those cases according to his own normative views
as well. There would still be nonproductive competition with respect
to the abortion issue, but the extra work involved might be more than
offset by the increased ability to impose his normative views on society.
Bert is better off because now seventy-five percent of the cases involv-
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ing either the abortion or the flag burning issue will be decided ac-
cording to his values, while only twenty-five percent of the cases will be
decided according to Ann's values.
Bert's advantage would be only temporary, however, for when
Ann discovers she has been exploited, she too will ignore their agree-
ment. By unilaterally abiding by the agreement, Ann is not only faced
with some nonproductive competition, the very phenomenon the
agreement was designed to avoid, but she also has lost her net ability
to have cases decided according to her own rather than Bert's norma-
tive views. Thus, Ann will restore some of her discretion by refusing to
be bound by Bert's precedents, with the result that the judges would
then occupy the same inferior position they encountered without an
agreement.
Ann prefers to restore her discretion by defecting, even at the
cost of increased nonproductive competition.4 1 That is, if she were
actually willing to reduce unilaterally her net ability to decide cases
according to her own values in order to eliminate some nonproduc-
tive competition, then the agreement would not be necessary. Ann
would simply save time by following Bert's precedents on her own.
The crucial aspect of their agreement is that it enabled each judge to
save time without jeopardizing either judge's net ability to decide
cases according to his or her own values. If Ann cannot maintain this
net balance of power by following Bert's precedents, she will restore
that balance even though it will mean more work for both judges.42
B. Enforcing the Agreement
Nevertheless, when an agreement to follow each other's prece-
dents is necessary to stare decisis, the judges can theoretically en-
force the agreement by virtue of the iterative nature of their
interaction. As long as the judges expect to work together indefi-
nitely, then each can use potential future benefits from stare decisis
to encourage present cooperation from the other. For example,
Ann and Bert may each decide to retaliate against each other's de-
41 When Bert unilaterally defected, nonproductive competition plagued only the
abortion issue, whereas if Ann also defects nonproductive competition will plague
both the abortion and flag burning issues.
42 Of course, this analysis depends on the model's underlying assumption that
judges primarily desire to impose their normative views on society and only seconda-
rily want to decrease the effort necessary to perform their duties. If Ann was merely
lazy and did not care at all about whether the legal system reflected her own values,
then she would continue to follow Bert's precedents regardless of Bert's behavior. It
seems much more likely, however, that a judge is at least somewhat concerned with
whether the legal system reflects her values. If so, Ann would presumably not willingly
follow some of Bert's precedents without an enforceable agreement.
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fections by refusing to follow the defecting judge's precedents. In
other words, at least in this grossly oversimplified model, the
judges can maintain an equilibrium of cooperation with the threat
of perpetual defection.
This trigger strategy equilibrium was first enunciated in the
industrial organization context, and the logic is relatively straight-
forward.43 As indicated earlier, Bert has an incentive to defect in
any single interaction by not following Ann's precedent. If Bert
does defect, however, then Ann may assume he will defect in the
future as well. If so, Ann can do no better than to defect herself.
Consequently, Ann can credibly threaten that if Bert refuses to fol-
low even one of her precedents, she will then forever refuse to fol-
low his precedents. By the same reasoning, Bert also can
strategically threaten perpetual defection. As a result, each agrees
to cooperate so long as the other one does, and each views the
repercussion of defecting as throwing the interaction back into the
noncooperative equilibrium forever.44 As demonstrated in Part II
C, in the long run the judges are better off in a cooperative equilib-
rium. Because each judge stands to lose all the benefits of future
cooperation by virtue of a single defection, each judge is willing to
cooperate by following the other's precedents.
As long as the gain from defecting today is less than or equal
to the present value of future losses from perpetual noncoopera-
tion, then both judges are willing to follow each other's prece-
dents. The gain from defecting today is equivalent to the payoff
received today from defecting (assuming the other judge cooper-
ates), minus the payoff today from mutual cooperation. The pres-
ent value of the loss from defecting today is equivalent to the
discounted expected value of a whole future of cooperation, minus
the discounted expected value of a whole future of nonproductive
competition. So long as this inequality holds, the judges would co-
operate by virtue of the iterative nature of their interaction.
Although the equilibrium solution holds in the simple model
presented thus far, it may fail as an effective strategy in more com-
43 James W. Friedman, A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames, 28 REv. OF
ECON. STUD. 1 (1971) (presenting trigger strategy of perpetual defection under condi-
tions of certainty). The optimal strategy for cartel members to adopt in response to
suspected cheating, which they infer from a drop in the market price below the price
that obtains when all firms produce at agreed upon levels, is to produce at competi-
tive levels thereafter. Id.
44 The noncooperative equilibrium is the pre-agreement state of affairs described
in Part 1I B. In effect, the judges threaten to disavow completely their agreement in
the event of a single defection.
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plicated models. The model presented does not allow judges to
control the breadth of their precedents, nor does it reflect uncer-
tainty as to which cases the preexisting precedents govern. The
next Part will analyze whether the judges can still enforce their
agreement in more complicated settings, and, if so, whether the
judges' optimal enforcement strategies differ in these settings.
IV. A SMALL DOSE OF REALrry. THE JUDGES' AGREEMENT WITH A
LiTrLE MORE REALISM
Part III demonstrated that stare decisis is, in theory, self-enforc-
ing. This Part will introduce more realism by first considering, in
section A, the judges' agreement and enforcement strategy when
each judge chooses the breadth of his precedents. Section B will
then consider how the optimal enforcement strategy might differ
with uncertainty. Conflicting precedents will be considered in sec-
tion C, and replacement mechanisms are discussed in section D.
A. Variable Precedents
For simplicity, assume that once a judge sets his holding in an
opinion, the other knows for certain which fact patterns are gov-
erned by that holding. Suppose, then, that Bert is assigned an ap-
peal that raises an issue not governed by any existing precedents.
To illustrate, suppose a defendant has appealed his conviction be-
cause the only evidence indicating the defendant committed the
crime was a witness's testimony based on an improper line-up iden-
tification. Bert thinks that the defendant's conviction should be
overturned unless the witness had a sufficient independent oppor-
tunity at the scene of the crime to identify the defendant as the
perpetrator. He concludes that, although the defendant was only
thirty feet away from the witness and wore light-colored clothing,
the witness did not have an adequate opportunity to view the de-
fendant because it was dark, and the perpetrator, who had no par-
ticularly distinguishing features, was turning to run when the
witness saw him.
Bert, therefore, reverses the conviction and writes an opinion
which can be represented diagrammatically as shown in Figure 2.
The horizontal axis represents the variance in the possible facts
when the issue is raised in criminal trials. X is that point in the fact
space which represents the facts of this appeal as found by the trial
court and described above. Those points lying to the right of X
could represent situations where the witness viewed a perpetrator
for a short period in daylight. Those points to the left of X could
7531993]
HeinOnline  -- 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 753 1993-1994
SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
represent situations where the perpetrator, who had unusual fea-
tures, was viewed at night, but for a longer period of time and at
closer range.45 The vertical axis represents the various probabili-
ties: that Bert would want a criminal conviction reversed, given the
circumstances surrounding an eyewitness identification at the
scene of the crime; that his opinion covers a particular fact pattern;
and that his holding governs a particular fact pattern.
As the facts in later cases differ increasingly from X, the
probability that Bert's opinion governs the later facts falls toward
zero for two reasons. First, as indicated by Bert's opinion, he him-
self becomes more equivocal as to the preferred outcome as the
facts vary from those presented in this appeal. Second, the hori-
zontal axis will only reflect those factual considerations deemed rel-
evant to Bert in this appeal. A later case might raise different types
of facts which are present along another dimension and therefore
not considered by Bert, such as how many lampposts lighted the
street, whether the perpetrator spoke, and the quality of the wit-
ness's visual acuity.
The endpoints of Bert's opinion, denoted in Figure 2 as points
A and B, represent those points at which the facts are sufficiently
different so that, as discussed in Part II A, the expected costs of
over-inclusion just outweigh the expected gains from influencing a
broader range of behavior. Bert can locate these endpoints in his
opinion with language such as, "were the facts presented A, or B,
this would be a different case."
To clarify, I assume that the lines which represent Bert's opin-
ion, OA and OB, are both continuous and eventually downward
sloping. By continuous, I mean that Bert cannot isolate the fact
pattern represented by W in Figure 2 as one fact pattern where he
would certainly affirm the conviction and also indicate he might
reverse convictions with fact patterns lying to the right of W. By
eventually downward sloping, I mean that even if Bert is certain
that he would also reverse convictions with facts close to X in the
fact space, at some point the facts will become sufficiently different
in at least one direction so that he is less certain he would want to
reverse. It is not necessary to assume that the lines representing
the opinion are either straight or symmetrical. Indeed, Bert may
think that even though he is willing to reverse this conviction, he
would affirm if it were any more light out. If so, he would write an
45 Line OX is actually the intersection of several planes, representing a time con-
tinuum, light continuum, distance continuum and a uniqueness continuum. For
diagrammatical ease, however, I have collapsed them all onto one continuum.
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X B
Fact
Patterns
Long period Short period
Night time Daylight
FIGURE 2
opinion noting that this is the most extreme case in which he
would reverse. Alternatively, he would refer to the facts in his opin-
ion as presenting "a close case" or "a hard case." OB would then be
a vertical line and OA would be a line sloping downward to the left
of X. Of course, the model also generally assumes that a judge
cares more about the correct legal rule than about the facts of the
case. If Bert were concerned only about the outcome of the partic-
ular case, however, he could limit his opinion to OX.
The distance between A and B in Figure 2 represents the
breadth of the opinion itself. In determining this distance, Bert
faces the same trade-off that was discussed in Part II. That is, the
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broader the language of the opinion, the wider the range of behav-
ior that is influenced. The probability that he will influence behav-
ior in a manner contrary to his normative views, however, will also
increase. For example, Bert might think that where a line-up iden-
tification is an important piece of evidence implicating a defend-
ant, then the police should take precautions to ensure that the
defendant is not falsely convicted. In these situations, he may re-
verse convictions so that the police take more care in the future. If
the witness, however, clearly knew at the crime scene exactly who
the perpetrator was (e.g., if the witness and the perpetrator had
been friends for many years), then Bert may believe that tax dollars
should not be spent to search for and hire individuals who physi-
cally resemble the defendant or to take other precautions regard-
ing the line-up. If these line-ups are mere technicalities, Bert will
be reluctant to write opinions indicating that elaborate procedures
always will be necessary to avoid conviction reversals. Such fact pat-
terns would fall outside of points A and B, indicating that in these
situations Bert is likely to reach the opposite result.4 6
Although Bert writes an opinion as represented in Figure 2, he
is unwilling to enforce reversals along the entire range of fact pat-
terns between A and B. That is, the closer the facts of a future case
are to A or B, the less incentive Bert has to punish Ann for not
following his opinion. As indicated in Part II, he himself is unsure
whether his precedent should govern fact patterns closer to A or B,
so he will want to leave some room for Ann to use her discretion.
Thus, Bert will indicate in his opinion a more narrow interval of
fact patterns, which also includes X, in which he will not tolerate
distinction or outright rejection of his precedent. He will there-
fore punish Ann if she does not follow his precedent when con-
fronted with facts within this more narrow range. Figure 3 is a
diagrammatic depiction of this phenomenon. The language of the
opinion is still represented by AOB, but Bert will only punish de-
fections which occur between C and D. That part of the opinion
which carves out the more narrow distance between C and D is
more commonly known as the holding.47
46 Note that this analysis also applies to the one-judge model in Part II A.
47 An assumption of the model is that a judge cannot formulate a discontinuous
holding. In other words, Bert cannot hold in the same case that convictions will be
reversed between fact patterns C and D in Figure 4, but will be affirmed in all cases to
the right of D. This restriction could be imposed by the judges themselves to prevent
territory-grabbing.
Alternatively, the restriction could be an external constraint arising out of the
case or controversy requirement of Article III. See supra notes 17-18 and accompany-
ing text. The case or controversy requirement forbids the resolution of abstract legal
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FIGURE 3
In effect, then, Bert's precedent, as viewed by third parties, is
more like that shown in Figure 4. When fact patterns lie between C
and D, the conviction will be reversed. When fact patterns lie be-
tween A and C and between D and B, Bert might reverse the con-
viction if he were assigned the appeal, but Ann would be free to
use her discretion if instead she were assigned the appeal. Bert will
issues by federal courts unless it is a necessary by-product of the resolution of particu-
lar disputes between individuals. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence Of Article III: Perspec-
tives On The "Case Or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297, 300 (1979). The
Article III requirement reflects a desire to avoid the "unfairness of holding later liti-
gants to an adverse judgment in which they may not have been properly represented."
Id. at 302. Under Article III, "[d]iscussion of hypothetical situations may be dismissed
by later courts as mere dicta." Id. at 304. Thus, the case or controversy requirement
may forbid discontinuous holdings.
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write an opinion broader than the holding as an information-pro-
viding mechanism, even though that part which is broader will not
be enforced. In effect, Bert is communicating to members of soci-
ety, as well as lower court judges, that there is some probability that
the appellate court will reverse convictions when the fact patterns
lie along either AC or DB. Given Bert's opinion, the greater the
probability on the vertical axis that corresponds with a particular
fact pattern on the horizontal axis, the greater the likelihood of a
reversed conviction, even though the probability that Bert is as-
signed the appeal is only fifty percent.
In fixing the breadth of his holding, Bert faces a trade-off simi-
lar to the one regarding the breadth of the opinion itself. As Bert
broadens his holding, he includes cases in which there is a lower
probability that he himself would reverse. Moreover, Ann can no
longer use her discretion with these fact pattems. 48 Assuming pun-
ishment is costly to Bert (he too must incur the costs associated
with nonproductive competition), he must be prepared to incur
these costs to punish Ann for distinguishing his precedent even in
cases where Bert might in fact agree with Ann's distinction. 49 He
will, therefore, want to limit the breadth of his holding to minimize
"incorrect" reversals.
Conversely, as Bert narrows his holding, Ann can use her dis-
cretion in cases where there is a higher probability that Bert favors
conviction reversals. Thus, Bert can no longer ensure reversals in
cases with fact patterns lying along these intervals. Bert will choose
for his holding that breadth which minimizes the expected costs of
undesirable reversals resulting when Ann is bound to follow his
holding, and undesirable affirmances resulting when Ann is per-
mitted to use her discretion.
Thus, the judges' enforcement mechanism can be described
as a trigger strategy. Bert will not punish Ann for failing to follow
his precedent when the facts lie further away from Bert's case, de-
noted by X in Figures 2-4. If, however, Ann fails to follow his prece-
dent for those cases with fact patterns lying within Bert's holding,
then Bert will punish Ann.
Under certainty, where both judges know exactly which fact
48 If Bert defers to Ann's specialized knowledge about a particular subject, as dis-
cussed supra in Part II B, then his holding will be quite narrow. Indeed, it may not
extend beyond X itself, enabling Ann to use virtually complete discretion in her area
of expertise.
49 If Bert does not punish Ann because he agrees with her distinction, then Ann
may think future distinctions also will be costless. To prevent these future distinc-
tions, Bert might retaliate against breaches which he thinks are sensible.
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patterns are governed by Bert's holding, the optimal punishment
for not following Bert's holding is still perpetual defection. That is,
Bert's best strategy is to announce to Ann that he will consider
their agreement to be null and void if she defects by failing to fol-
low even one of Bert's holdings. If both judges announce this per-
petual defection strategy as part of their agreement, they will be
providing the greatest possible deterrence against defections. Ann
will be deterred from defecting in any given case because, although
she can impose her own normative views in one additional case by
defecting, she cannot be any more successful on net in imposing
her values without the agreement. As before, nonproductive com-
petition will create a great deal of additional work for her. There-
fore, because Ann stands to lose all the benefits of the agreement
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by defecting even once, she has no incentive ever to defect. Perfect
enforcement of the judges' holdings would result.
B. Thoughts on the Agreement With Uncertainty
At this point the attentive reader has undoubtedly noticed that
the assumption of certainty imposed earlier is highly unrealistic.
The judges simply lack the resources necessary to write every hold-
ing with sufficient precision to eliminate all ambiguity concerning
its breadth. Even if the judges faced no time constraints, language
is inherently ambiguous,5 ° making perfect precision unattainable.
This section therefore considers how the optimal enforcement
strategy might differ under conditions of uncertainty.51 More spe-
cifically, assume now that there is some uncertainty about precisely
which fact patterns lie within each holding.
The same trade-offs influence Bert's opinion and holding with
uncertainty. Adopting an enforcement strategy with the greatest
possible deterrence, however, is no longer optimal. To illustrate,
suppose Bert writes his opinion and holding as shown diagrammat-
ically in Figure 4. In the following period, Ann is assigned an ap-
peal concerning a criminal defendant whose conviction was based
on a tainted line-up identification. The fact pattern associated with
the case is denoted as Z in Figure 4. That is, Bert intended his
holding to govern fact pattern Z. Because the language he used in
setting his holding was ambiguous, however, Ann sincerely believes
that Z lies outside of Bert's holding. Believing that she is therefore
free to use her discretion, Ann distinguishes fact pattern Z from
fact pattern X and affirms the conviction.
If Bert follows a strategy of perpetual defection, he will declare
their agreement null and void. Because the judges inevitably will
misapply holdings to future fact patterns, an enforcement strategy
of perpetual defection by either judge will severely diminish their
ability to reap the benefits of their agreement. As soon as the first
mistake is made, the judges will return to the inferior position they
occupied without an agreement.
Bert could modify his strategy to forgive Ann's mistaken fail-
50 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 3, at 268 (noting inherent ambiguity of
language).
51 Unfortunately, game theory has not yet advanced to the point where anyone can
precisely specify the judges' agreement and the enforcement mechanism under un-
certainty. This section therefore proceeds with the caveat that only a very general
discussion is possible. The type of equilibrium discussed in this section exists in a
broad class of uncertainty settings and is treated in Dilip Abreu et al., Optimal Cartel
Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring, 39 J. ECON. THEORY 251 (1986).
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ures to follow Bert's holdings, but it would be difficult if not impos-
sible for Bert to distinguish Ann's mistakes from her deliberate
defections. Bert's difficulties will be compounded if Ann knows
that good faith mistakes will be forgiven, for then she will have an
incentive to feign mistaken misapplications. And if he misinter-
prets a good faith mistake as a deliberate defection, then both
judges will be forever deprived of the benefits of stare decisis.
Under uncertainty, then, the judges must adopt a less drastic
enforcement strategy that is sufficient to deter defections without
risking all the benefits of the agreement. In addition, each judge
will want to allow for good faith mistakes without being exploited.
Given these difficulties, their optimum enforcement strategy is sim-
ilar to that described in an article written by Edward Green and
Robert Porter.52
Green and Porter identified the equilibrium cartel enforce-
ment strategy when each firm in an oligopolistic industry does not
know the production levels of the other firms. In their model, the
firms form a cartel and agree to produce only a given level of out-
put. The firms are unable to observe directly each other's output
to monitor whether other firms are cheating. A firm can deter-
mine whether other firms are cheating by observing whether the
firm had lower profits in the previous period. Because lower prof-
its could also indicate that demand was lower for the previous pe-
riod, however, the firm cannot tell with certainty whether the other
firms are cheating. If the firm's profits fall below a certain level,
however, it becomes statistically less likely that the reduced profits
are simply a result of reduced demand for the product. Therefore,
they agree that if profits fall below a given level, the firms will re-
sort to competitive outputs for a predetermined period of time
during which all firms are deprived of monopoly profits. This pun-
ishment period is made just long enough so that the marginal ben-
efit from cheating is outweighed by the costs of punishment. The
result is that none of the cartel members ever cheat (at least not
more than a small amount). There will still, however, be punish-
ment periods characterized by price wars when demand does in
fact fall far enough to drop profits below the trigger level.
Applying this cartel strategy to our judges, the equilibrium
strategy under uncertainty can be achieved in the following man-
ner. Each judge knows that a certain percentage of a judge's fail-
ures to follow past holdings is consistent with the uncertainty
52 EdwardJ. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price
Information, 52 ECONOMETRCA 87 (1984).
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created by ambiguous language. As that percentage rises, it be-
comes less likely that distinguishing a precedent is a result of mis-
take rather than deliberate defection. Suppose, for ease of
exposition, Ann and Bert agree that, on average, a judge would
mistakenly fail to follow a holding ten percent of the time under
conditions of uncertainty. Thus, they agree that if Ann fails to fol-
low Bert's holdings more than ten percent of the time, Bert will
punish Ann by refusing to follow one or more of Ann's precedents.
They will specify in their agreement the number of precedents Bert
will refuse to follow as punishment.53 That number will be just
large enough so that the marginal gain to Ann from refusing to
follow Bert's precedents is usually smaller than the cost to Ann of
Bert's punishment. Thus, the punishment will be just large
enough to deter most deliberate defections.
The optimal enforcement is thus a trigger strategy: punish-
ment is triggered by exceeding a probabilistic determination of the
frequency of good faith mistakes. If the amount of punishment is
set properly in the agreement, deliberate defections will rarely oc-
cur.54 Nevertheless, the judges will still resort to punishment when
mistakes occur more than ten percent of the time. The judges are
forced to punish some honest mistakes to prevent feigned mis-
takes. This strategy is optimal because many mistakes can be "for-
given" and deliberate defections are controlled.
Because some punishment is inevitable under uncertainty,
each judge faces a second trade-off in setting the breadth of his
holding. Assuming a predetermined punishment level, a judge
may prefer to write a more narrow holding when he suspects the
53 Punishments would probably not count toward the ten percent defection limit.
Thus, the judges would have to signal that they are punishing rather than defecting.
If the judges agree to a fixed amount of punishment, the pattern of punishment
could help to indicate that a judge is punishing. In addition, the punishing judge
could cite the defecting cases to further indicate punishment.
54 Because the enforcement strategy is probabilistically triggered, an occasional
deliberate defection is still possible. For example, although Ann cannot be certain,
she may be fairly sure that she has not made any mistakes for a number of periods. If
under the agreement she is required to apply a precedent she finds distasteful, she
may have an incentive to "misread" the holding to avoid applying it to the fact pattern
of the appeal. After all, the likelihood of triggering Bert's punishment is relatively
low if she has not made mistakes recently. Of course, she still risks punishments be-
cause she could make a number of mistakes in the next period. If she is concerned
about making mistakes in the next period, however, she may apply Bert's holdings to
fact patterns which she actually thinks lie outside the holdings to avoid punishment.
This incentive for both judges to utilize probabilistic strategies in their decision-mak-
ing and enforcement is exactly what makes game theory under uncertainty so compli-
cated. See supra note 51.
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other judge strongly disagrees with his resolution of an issue. This
assertion requires some elaboration.
First, when the punishment is specified ex ante, it must be large
enough to deter most defections. The stronger Ann's disagree-
ment with Bert's precedent (in the sense that Ann cares very much
about the determination of that issue and thinks Bert's precedent
affects society detrimentally) the greater Ann's temptation to dis-
tinguish or reject Bert's precedents and bear the punishment cost.
The broader Bert sets his holding, the more potential cases that
present the danger of defection. The threatened punishment, as
fixed in the agreement, must therefore be greater than the benefit
of defection in order to deter defection. At the same time, Bert
will want to minimize the necessary amount of punishment to re-
duce the risk that Ann will retaliate against his punishments. Ann
might retaliate if she misinterprets Bert's punishments for deliber-
ate defections.
Bert may thus choose a compromise position by setting a nar-
row holding so that Ann is required to follow a controversial prece-
dent only in a few cases. Even though he would most like to
constrain Ann's discretion regarding these issues, the compromise
reduces the temptation to defect, thus lessening the required pun-
ishment for effective deterrence. Consequently, when the two
judges strongly disagree, relevant holdings may be narrower than
in the one-judge model presented in Part II A. In the one-judge
model, the judge restricted the breadth of his holding only to pre-
serve his own discretion. In this two-judge model, he is also con-
cerned that he not make his holding so broad that the otherjudge
finds it pays to defect.
C. Conflicting Precedents
The judges will undoubtedly want a rule governing conflicting
precedents, as illustrated in Figure 5. Suppose Ann is assigned an
appeal by a doctor who was convicted for performing an abortion
on a sixteen-year-old patient who was six weeks pregnant. These
facts are represented by Xa on the horizontal axis. The points on
the far right of the horizontal axis represent abortions performed
on very young patients who are in their first days of pregnancy,
while the points on the far left represent patients over twenty-five
years of age who are in their very last days of pregnancy.
Ann writes an opinion represented by COD in Figure 5. She
intimates that almost any woman old enough to become pregnant
has by force become mature enough to make decisions regarding
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her own body. She also intimates, however, that the state has some
interest in regulating abortions which occur in the last months of
pregnancy, especially those months in which babies have been
born and survived. Ann restricts her holding to those fact patterns
lying between E and F. She reverses the conviction and declares
that a doctor cannot be prosecuted for performing an abortion on
a woman older than sixteen years who is in her first trimester of
pregnancy. She reasons that these women have an absolute right
to an abortion, and that the right would be impinged upon if doc-
tors risked legal sanctions by helping these women exercise that
right.
Suppose then, that in the following period Bert is assigned an
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appeal by a doctor convicted of performing an abortion on a
twenty-year-old woman who is five months pregnant. These facts
are represented by Xb in Figure 5. These facts lie outside Ann's
holding, so Bert will not risk punishment if he fails to reverse this
conviction. Bert therefore affirms the conviction and distinguishes
this case on the ground that this patient was much further along in
her pregnancy. His opinion is represented by GMH and the
breadth of his holding is represented by IJ. He holds that when-
ever a woman is more than ten weeks pregnant, the state will be
permitted to regulate the performance of those abortions. Note
that the facts lying along EJ are now covered by two conflicting
holdings. These fact patterns represent abortions performed on
women who are over sixteen-years-old and have been pregnant for
ten to thirteen weeks.
The judges can protect their precedents only with a rule that,
in the event two conflicting holdings cover the same fact patterns,
the first holding governs. Under any other provision or practice, a
judge who disagrees with a precedent could undermine it com-
pletely by writing a broad holding in a case which is not technically
covered by a pre-existing holding. Even with this rule, Bert may
nevertheless write such a conflicting precedent in an effort to con-
vince Ann that her precedent is not well-suited for facts along EJ as
a result of depreciation or better information. For example, tech-
nological advancements may have enabled a woman to determine
reliably that she is pregnant much sooner after fertilization or fe-
tuses may become viable after only ten weeks of pregnancy. In ad-
dition, if Bert is uncertain exactly which fact patterns lie just to the
right and left of point E in Figure 5, he may write this conflicting
precedent to ensure that Ann's holding is not applied further than
the bounds of her original holding.55 Ann may choose to recon-
sider her holding, but unless and until she does, her holding must
continue to govern the facts along EJ. If Bert's arguments per-
suade her, she is free to narrow her holding to J in a later case.
D. Mechanisms For Replacement
If the model is correct, then the judges' agreement would in-
clude no provision for eliminating bad or obsolete precedents
other than a rule that a holding is binding until its author decides
55 This second rationale explains why Bert does not simply limit his holding but
instead writes a broad opinion to convince Ann that she is wrong. In addition, a
conflicting holding should generate a temporary increase in appeals, providing Ann
an opportunity to reconsider the issue.
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that it was erroneous or has become obsolete. This relative inabil-
ity to replace precedents is a function of a model in which a deci-
sion is not "correct" in any absolute or objective sense. Recall that
in the model, a decision is regarded as either correct or incorrect
only insofar as it furthers the normative views of the judge who is
assessing its wisdom. For the judge who wrote the holding, it is
correct because it encourages behavior that he desires. Unless he
later decides that such behavior does not in fact further his norma-
tive views or that the holding is unnecessary to further his values, to
him the decision is correct. Thus, Bert would not agree to a provi-
sion whereby Ann could replace his precedent if Ann (or scholarly
commentators) deemed it to be incorrect.
Consequently, internally generated stare decisis inevitably cre-
ates a legal system that is sometimes saddled with seemingly ill-
suited or archaic principles. At least three forces can alleviate the
potential entrenchment of bad decisions by the appellate judges:
(1) replacement of judges; (2) a legislature; and, (3) supreme
court or en banc review.
First, bad precedents can eventually be replaced when new
judges are appointed to the appellate court. The model presented
assumes that the judiciary is stable over time because Ann and Bert
are the only appellate judges who decide cases in perpetuity. If we
relax this assumption and Bert eventually retires, then Ann and
Doug, Bert's replacement, can begin replacing Bert's "bad" prece-
dents.56 In other words, to the extent that Bert's views are not
shared by other judges when he retires, his precedents will be
replaced."
Ann and Doug have the same incentives to form an agreement
and avoid nonproductive competition that existed for Ann and
Bert. When a case that would previously have been governed by
one of Bert's holdings is appealed, the judge who hears the appeal
can either ratify Bert's precedent or replace it by ignoring it, distin-
guishing it, or rejecting it outright. This judge's holding will then
govern.
The legal status of Bert's precedents thus becomes uncertain
when he retires. Litigants will therefore be more likely to appeal
their cases to the extent they deal with one of Bert's holdings. If
56 The precedents will not necessarily be overruled. Ann and Doug may instead
distinguish and qualify Bert's precedents until they no longer carry any force, espe-
cially where the societal concern for legal stability is potent.
57 Other judges who agree with Bert's precedents may protect them. Where the
precedent reflects neither Ann's nor Doug's normative views, however, it will most
certainly be replaced.
766 [Vol. 24:736
HeinOnline  -- 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 766 1993-1994
STARE DECISIS
everything were constant we would expect an increase in docket
congestion when an appellate judge is replaced. Indeed, we would
expect increased appeals as soon as Bert announces his retirement
plans. If Bert is leaving, he has less opportunity to punish Ann for
failing to apply his holdings. Thus, the deterrent effect of
threatened punishment wanes as Bert's official retirement ap-
proaches. Bert's precedents will only be protected to the extent his
normative views are shared by the other judges.
The model also includes neither a legislature nor a judicial
entity with powers to review the appellate judges' decisions. A leg-
islative entity other than the court itself could be granted the
power to override those precedents it deemed to be "incorrect." In
addition, a legal system could include a supreme court or an en
banc panel to review and override an appellate judge's precedent.
Of course, these structural options also include a risk of en-
trenching bad decisions. Some thoughts concerning supreme
court review of the judges' decisions are presented below.
V. EFFECT OF SUPREME COURT ON JUDGES' AGREEMENT
The model described above lacks a supreme court to review
the appellate judges' decisions, and it is beyond the scope of this
Article to superimpose a supreme court onto the model and pres-
ent an exhaustive analysis of the interaction between the supreme
court and the appellate judges. Two points, however, can be made
about the role of a supreme court. First, the presence of a
supreme court is consistent with thejudges' agreement so long as it
reviews the appellate judges' decisions only occasionally. Second,
the supreme court has an incentive to help enforce adherence to
those precedents with which it agrees.
To help illustrate these points, suppose ajudge named Susie is
appointed to be the sole judge on a supreme court which reviews
decisions by the appellate judges. If Susie reviewed every decision
made by the appellate judges, no agreement between Ann and
Bert to follow each other's precedents would ever evolve or be rele-
vant. Susie would simply produce her own rules or holdings to ef-
fectuate her own normative views. Assuming it is costly to
contravene Susie's decisions, Ann and Bert would apply Susie's
holdings in future cases. Susie can make deviation costly by humili-
ating the appellate judge in her opinion and/or by remanding the
case to the wayward judge so that he has more work to do. Ann
and Bert would have no incentive to form an agreement because
their "precedents" would effectively be little more than recommen-
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dations presented to Susie. Their own precedents never persevere
beyond the appeal, so any attempt to bind the other judge would
be pointless. Thus, we would be back to the single judge model
presented in Part II A with Ann and Bert as "filters" and agents of a
higher court.
If, instead, Susie reviewed appellate court decisions only occa-
sionally, then Ann and Bert would still have an incentive to form
an agreement. For example, suppose that Susie has discretionary
review, and she possesses the resources to grant certiorari for only
a small percentage of petitions. Now Ann and Bert could reason-
ably expect that they would collectively dispose of more than one
appeal raising any given issue before Susie granted certiorari. If
they agreed to follow each other's precedents until Susie exposits
her own precedent governing a particular issue, then they could
avoid nonproductive competition in the interim. Thus, the judges'
agreement is consistent with the presence of a supreme court so
long as the supreme court has only a limited capacity to review the
judges' decisions.
Thus far it has been implicitly assumed that the supreme court
judge would be disinterested in the judges' agreement. If, how-
ever, the supreme court benefitted from the agreement, then Susie
might take actions to help reinforce it and thereby make coopera-
tion between Ann and Bert more stable.5" As explained below, the
supreme court wants to unambiguously reinforce appellate stare de-
cisis only under some circumstances.
To illustrate, suppose Susie only grants certiorari when the ap-
pellate judges render decisions contrary to her own normative
views. This is not to say she hears each and every case where she
disagrees with an appellate judge's outcome. When she observes,
however, that one or both of the appellate judges are exhibiting a
pattern of deciding appeals "incorrectly" with respect to a particu-
lar issue, then she will grant certiorari to impose her normative
views on society.59
58 Part III noted that enforcement of stare decisis must come from the judges them-
selves because resort to the courts is unavailable. Here I consider whether a supreme
court has an incentive to provide such enforcement.
59 Of course, the United States Supreme Court sometimes affirms an appellate
court decision without circuit conflict. This may be explained in part by the "rule of
four" certiorari requirements. See CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 757 (4th ed. 1983) (certiorari is granted whenever four justices vote for a
grant). In 1946 and 1947, the decision to grant certiorari was supported by only four
votes in over 25 percent of the cases. In 1979, 23 percent of the petitions granted
received only four votes. In 1980, the figure was greater than 30 percent; in 1981, it
was 29 percent. Stevens, supra note 3, at 16-17. When the disposition vote is taken,
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Suppose further that each appellate judge decided two ap-
peals in period 1, and that one decision by each judge was consis-
tent with the other's normative views, while the other was not.
Without an agreement, two of these four issues would each have
one governing rule and the other two issues would each be subject
to contrary rules. With respect to the two issues that have one gov-
erning rule, Susie will grant certiorari only if she disagrees with the
rule generated by the appellate judges. In contrast, with respect to
the two issues governed by contrary rules, Susie must hear at least
one appeal dealing with each of the two issues in order to impose
her normative views on society by announcing her own governing
rule.
If instead Ann and Bert followed each other's precedents,
then each of the four issues would be governed by one rule. So
long as Susie agrees with either of the judges' precedents some of
the time, she will need to grant certiorari less often to impose her
normative views. In other words, if after several periods the appel-
late judges disagreed over the appropriate resolution of ten issues,
Susie must hear all ten issues to impose her normative views with-
out the judges' agreement. With the judges' agreement in effect,
she need hear only those issues when she disagrees with the appel-
late judges' governing precedents. In this sense the judges' agree-
ment enables Susie to impose her own normative views with less
effort, so we could expect that she would be willing to help enforce
it by making defection more costly.60
On the other hand, if Susie disagrees with the original prece-
dent, she must eventually grant certiorari to impose her normative
views regardless of whether that precedent is followed by the other
appellate judge. Thus, if Bert sets a precedent with which Susie
disagrees, she saves no time if Ann follows the precedent. Indeed,
Susie is actually better off if Ann refuses to follow Bert's precedent
because when Ann defects, at least some of the appeals decided
before Susie has a chance to grant certiorari will have outcomes
she prefers.
As a result, Susie wants unambiguously to elicit their coopera-
tion only when she agrees with the precedents. Her incentive to
the justices who voted to grant certiorari may be unable to muster enough votes to
reverse the appellate court. Alternatively, societal behavior may be more definitively
affected if the highest court in the land supports the precedent. The Court may
therefore hear these cases to reinforce those values the justices feel strongly about.
60 She could do so by humiliating the defector in her opinions, by not inviting him
to parties, or by making sure she overturns the defector's decisions when enunciating
her own precedents.
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reinforce their agreement uniformly will depend on whether the
benefits of hearing fewer appeals are greater than the interim costs
of appellate court decisions which create unwanted behavioral
incentives.6 '
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
This Article has focused on explaining stare decisis as a rule that
self-interested judges will adopt themselves rather than one that
society imposes on reluctant judges. Assuming the model makes
sense in theory, has it succeeded in predicting that a rule of stare
decisis will exist where it in fact exists in practice? If so, does the
model predict that stare decisis will successfully constrain decision-
making, or is stare decisis really little more than a mirage invented
by judges in an effort to have us, as well as other judges, believe
they are constrained? Finally, does the model predict any particu-
lar attributes of judicial decision-making under stare decisis?
A. When Will Stare Decisis Evolve?
This Article primarily models courts with more than one deci-
sion-making entity at the same level of a judicial hierarchy. There-
fore, although a supreme court may adopt stare decisis with respect
to its own precedents to discourage appeals, the model does not
focus on a court that sits as a single decision maker. And, except
for positing that higher courts can make it costly for lower courts to
ignore their precedents, the model also has little to say about lower
courts following the precedents of higher courts. Rather, the Arti-
cle most appropriately models courts with two or more appellate
judges who each have equal and independent authority to decide
cases, either individually or in multiple panels.
61 Landes and Posner posit that the Supreme Court does check the frequency of
appellate court judges ignoring each other's precedents. Landes & Posner, supra
note 3, at 273. They argue that:
[the Court's] power to reverse the decisions of lower courts checks any
tendency on the part of lower-court judges to disregard precedent...
and its own position in the judicial hierarchy checks its members' ten-
dencies in that direction. If the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to accord
precedential weight to earlier Supreme Court decisions, it thereby un-
dermines the precedential weight of its own decisions.... [I] t would
appear that judges whose decisions are not subject to reversal by a
higher court will adhere to precedent less consistently than those judges
whose decisions can be reversed.
Id. While this argument persuasively demonstrates how the Supreme Court can pro-
tect its own precedents, it fails to explain whether the Court either can or should
enforce lower court adherence to each other's precedents.
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The model predicts that when there are two or more decision-
making entities at the same level in a judicial hierarchy and a
higher court reviews the judges' decisions only occasionally, then
stare decisis will evolve simply because it is in the judges' interests to
adopt the rule. To ascertain whether the predictions of the model
fit actual practice, the model will be applied to three aspects of the
American judicial system: (1) tribunals within federal circuits; (2)
the interaction between federal circuits; and, (3) district courts
within federal circuits. Finally, I will consider briefly the predicted
effects of life tenure on stare decisis.
1. Tribunals Within Federal Circuits
In each federal circuit, typically a dozen or more judges sit in
panels of three to hear appeals. The judges are commonly under-
stood to make decisions subject to stare decisis.6 2 That is, if one
panel of judges generates a precedent to govern a particular legal
issue, then future panels are to apply that precedent when the issue
arises again. Thus, the tribunals within each federal circuit follow
their colleagues' precedents, as predicted by the model. To ex-
plain, if different tribunals within a federal circuit apply different
governing rules to appeals, then the number of appeals to the cir-
cuit raising that issue will be greater than if only one rule governed
appeals. Because the United States Supreme Court reviews exceed-
ingly few court of appeals decisions, the judges retain an incentive
to prevent conflicts within their circuit. Thus, stare decisis would
eliminate nonproductive competition and thereby reduce docket
congestion, without compromising each judge's net influence on
policy.
Of course, judicial decision-making in a tribunal setting is
more complicated than that of the model. Because the composi-
tion ofjudicial panels is not stable, one panel cannot simply punish
another panel for not following its precedents. The individual
judges who generate a conflicting precedent, however, can be pun-
ished by refusing to follow a precedent which each of the defecting
62 See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Medical Servs., Inc., 855 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("Absent overruling, we must follow the law of this Circuit."); Fulford v.
Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1976) ("One panel of this Court cannot overrule a
decision of the previous panel, absent controlling Supreme Court authority."); Doe v.
Charleston Area Medical Center, 529 F.2d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1975) (decision is bind-
ing on not only a district court but also the circuit court, unless reconsidered en banc);
In re Central R.R. Co. of NewJersey, 485 F.2d 208, 210-11 (3d Cir. 1973) ("it has long
been the rule in this Circuit that decisions made in similar cases by panels of this
Court are binding on other panels") (footnote omitted).
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judges authored.6" Alternatively, the author of the original prece-
dent could punish a defecting judge by writing a scathing, personal
dissent when the two of them sit on the same panel. In short then,
even though the model is simplistic, it accurately predicts that the
appellate judges within each federal circuit will respect each
other's precedents.
2. Intercircuit Stare Decisis
In contrast, stare decisis does not apply across federal circuits. 4
For example, the Second Circuit is not bound to follow the prece-
dents generated by the Fifth Circuit. The model would predict no
rule of stare decisis here because an agreement to follow an other
circuit's precedents will not save the judges in a particular circuit
much time.65 When a litigant files a case in the District Court of
Vermont, he knows that if his case is appealed, it will be heard by
the Second Circuit. So long as there is only one rule governing
issues in the Second Circuit, the number of appeals heard by the
Second Circuit will be affected. It is not necessary for Second Cir-
cuit judges to follow the Fifth Circuit's precedents to control
docket congestion. Therefore, they would be unwilling to con-
strain themselves.66
65 Because appellate disposition requires that two of the three panel members be
in accord, a third judge might dissent to avoid later punishment.
64 See Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306 n.2 (2d Cir.
1974) (cases from other circuits do not bind the court); City Stores v. Lerner Shops of
the District of Columbia, 410 F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("Decisions of district
courts and other courts of appeals are, of course, not binding on us and are looked to
only for their persuasive effect."); see generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz,
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 735-36 (1989) (evalu-
ating the costs and benefits of intercircuit nonacquiescence). Florida's district courts
of appeal do not follow intercircuit stare decisis either. As with the federal circuits, the
Florida appellate courts each govern an exclusive geographic area, so that appeals
from district court decisions are always assigned to a specific appellate court. See gener-
ally Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Among and Within -Horida's District Courts of Appea 18
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 143, 147-55 (1990).
65 Moreover, a judge residing in Connecticut may care less about the qualitative
life in Texas than he does about individual behavior in Connecticut.
66 Nonetheless, intercircuit stare decisis governing issues related to federal adminis-
trative agency actions might enable federal judges to reduce agency "nonacquies-
cence" and its consequent appeals. Allan D. Vestal, Relitigation by Federal Agencies:
Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis ofJudicial Policies, 55 N.C. L. REv. 123, 174-76 (1977)
(advocating an intercircuit rule of stare decisis with respect to governmental relitiga-
tion policies). When administrative agencies engage in nonacquiescence, they con-
tinue specific behavior even after a federal appeals court rules that the behavior
exceeds the scope of their delegated powers or violates the Administrative Procedure
Act. Because aggrieved parties must continue to appeal for relief even when a circuit
follows its own precedents, intracircuit stare decisis alone will not reduce appeals.
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3. District Courts Within Federal Courts
Although the judges in the model sit on appellate courts, the
model can be applied to horizontal stare decisis among district
courts within each federal circuit. After all, district courts also have
coequal authority to decide cases, and they can alleviate docket
congestion if they agree to follow each other's precedents.
It is unclear whether district courts actually follow a rule of
horizontal stare decisis. At least two commentators have noted that
"[a] lthough most treatises consider a district court judge to be
bound by the decisions of his colleagues on the court, case law
shows that some judges do not believe this to be the case. Instead,
they view the precedential effect of other judges' decisions as per-
suasive, but not binding authority."67 Consequently, they conclude
that the function and importance of precedent in a district court
proceeding remains unclear.6a
Despite some similar incentives between federal district and
As one author suggested, an agency might engage in nonacquiescence because
of the necessity for one uniform national policy regarding its procedures. SeeJoshua
I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77
GEO. L.J. 1815, 1818-19 (1989). Intercircuit stare decisis may be the way to eliminate
this agency nonacquiescence. If all the circuits followed the decision of the prece-
dent-setting circuit, a uniform policy would be generated. The agency need not worry
about whether a single appellate decision is aberrant. Cf. Charles H. Nails & Paul R.
Bardos, Stare Decisis and the U.S. Court of International Trade: Two Case Studies of a Peren-
nial Issue, 14 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 139, 140 & n.6 (1990-91) (conflict and lack of consis-
tency among various decisions of Court of International Trade fuels agency
nonacquiescence).
If agencies engage in nonacquiescence for alternative reasons, however, intercir-
cuit stare decisis is less likely to reduce appeals. For example, some argue that
although an agency must respect a court's judgment in a particular case, the court
lacks the power to establish executive policies. See Schwartz, supra, at 1824-25 & n.27
(government argues that nonacquiescence lawfully prevents interference with an
agency's exercise of delegated legislative authority). If this rationale drives nonacqui-
escence, appeals might not be reduced even if every federal circuit adopted identical
limitations on agency authority.
Even assuming that the former rather than the latter rationale motivates agency
nonacquiescence, perhaps frequent Supreme Court review of decisions regarding
agency actions obviates the necessity for intercircuit stare decisis. Agencies seeking a
uniform policy or avoiding aberrant holdings must rely on circuit conflicts to justify
nonacquiescence. Once a conflict arises, however, the Supreme Court is much more
likely to grant certiorari and settle the issue on its own. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra
note 64, at 751-52 & n.331 (Supreme Court rarely fails to intervene where there devel-
ops an intercircuit conflict of any real importance). Thus, the circuits have little op-
portunity to engage in nonproductive competition, and an agency motivated by one
of these concerns will cease to engage in nonacquiescence. As a result, the number of
appeals will be reduced even without intercircuit cooperation.
67 Nails & Bardos, supra note 66, at 146.
68 Id. at 147.
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appellate courts, the model weakly predicts that district courts will
not, in fact, adopt horizontal stare decisis. Unlike the courts of ap-
peals, whose decisions are infrequently reviewed, litigants have an
automatic right to appeal district court decisions.69 As a result, op-
portunities for nonproductive competition among district court
judges are likely to be quite infrequent, thereby eliminating most
of the benefits of an agreement. Nevertheless, the predictions are
not unambiguous. Some litigants may forgo their right to appeal,
notwithstanding conflicting precedents. Moreover, many appeals
are disposed of summarily or with a nonprecedential memoran-
dum opinion.70 Because the appellate courts cannot effectively
scrutinize every district court opinion, there may be some non-
productive competition that stare decisis could eliminate.
4. Life Tenure and Stare Decisis
Under the common presumption that stare decisis is a rule im-
posed by society to constrain judges, judges with life tenure and
guaranteed salaries should be less likely to follow stare decisis than
judges who are elected or appointed for a short term. If the con-
straint is externally imposed and enforced, then judges who are
less insulated from political pressures should be more likely to be
constrained by stare decisis.
Precisely the opposite is true. English and American federal
judges are structurally isolated from most political pressures, yet
the appellate judges believe they have a strong obligation to follow
each other's precedents. In contrast, non-Article III judges and
many elected state judges deny a strict obligation to follow their
colleagues' precedents. 71
The model outlined in this Article better predicts the actual
practice. Judges who serve for limited terms or who are subject to
mandatory retirement laws are asked to leave the bench on a fixed
date. Thus, the judges' strategic interactions are plagued by the
69 Id. at 146-47.
70 See 1B JAms W. MooRE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcmcE 11 (2d ed. 1988);
Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in
the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 541,554 (1989) ("[I]n recent years, substan-
tially more than half of [the Ninth Circuit's] cases have been decided by unpublished
opinions."); Nails & Bardos, supra note 66, at 144; Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at
268 n.29.
71 See, e.g., Mattis, supra note 5, at 274 (Michigan appellate courts failed to follow
horizontal stare decisis); Taylor Mattis & Kenneth G. Yalowitz, Stare Decisis Among [Sic]
The AppeUate Court of Illinois, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 571, 573 (1979) (elected Illinois appel-
late judges do not follow horizontal stare decisis); Nalls & Bardos, supra note 66, at 140-
43 (no stare decisis on U.S. Court of International Trade).
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same unravelling problem present in all strategic games with fixed
end points.7" Because judges with life tenure do not know when
their colleagues will step down, the unravelling problem is re-
duced. Consequently, stare decisis is more likely to evolve when
judges are granted life tenure.
B. Predicted Strength of Stare Decisis
Assuming, then, that the model accurately predicts the exist-
ence of stare decisis, does it predict that stare decisis will constrain the
judges' decision-making in any way? First, the model predicts that
when ajudge is setting a precedent he will set his holding narrower
than the language in the opinion, in part to enable more effective
enforcement of his precedents. Furthermore, it predicts that a
judge will write narrower holdings when he is writing controversial
opinions. Thus, the model predicts that a judge will be con-
strained in setting precedents.
With respect to following precedents, the model predicts that
judges will be constrained to follow precedents so long as they util-
ize an effective enforcement mechanism. Unlike the model, how-
ever, in actual practice judges can recharacterize issues7 s and
characterize facts"4 to produce the outcomes they desire. It might
be argued, then, that these techniques can be used to circumvent
72 To illustrate, suppose Ann and Bert are appointed for a fixed term consisting of
three periods. In period 3, the judges will not follow each other's disagreeable prece-
dents because neither judge has a future opportunity to punish defections. Without a
threat of punishment, each judge has no incentive to follow those precedents with
which the judge disagrees. If each judge knows in period 2 that his or her precedents
will be disregarded in period 3, then the judges have no incentive to follow each
other's precedents in period 2 because there will be no future benefits to their agree-
ment. Similarly, if the judges know in period I that their precedents will be disre-
garded in period 2 and 3, then they will not create a stare decisis agreement in period
1.
73 For example, in Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163 (1928),
plaintiff was injured by a defendant who, like plaintiff, was driving negligently. The
plaintiff brought a tort action, but under applicable choice of law principles the law of
Massachusetts, which would not allow recovery, would apply to the action. Rather
than leave one of its citizens uncompensated, the Connecticut court characterized the
issue as one of contract so that it could apply Connecticut law, which would therefore
allow the plaintiff to recover for his injuries. Because a Connecticut statute provided
that an injured plaintiff could sue the renter of the motor vehicle for damages, the
court found that the right to recovery became part of the plaintiff's contract with the
lessor of the car. Consequently, the plaintiff could hold the lessor liable under Con-
necticut law.
74 See Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1, 21 (1983) ("By select-
ing and emphasizing certain facts that comport with the result the court wants to
reach, judges have considerable leeway to distinguish the case from unwanted prece-
dent.") (footnote omitted).
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precedents altogether. The number of cases in which issues can be
effectively recharacterized is limited, however. Most of the time a
recharacterization will seem artificial,75 and its artificiality is an in-
dication of defection that will not go unpunished by a shrewd
judge. An appellate judge is somewhat constrained in his ability to
characterize the facts of a case as well because the trial court does
most of the fact-finding. 7 In addition, dissenting judges are quick
to point out where the majority has failed to characterize the facts
of a case fairly.77 Such dissenting comments are likewise indica-
tions of defections. The judge who set the precedent has the abil-
ity to punish these attempts to recharacterize the facts. Thus, while
problems of characterization and recharacterization will tend to
weaken the constraining ability of stare decisis, they should not elim-
inate it altogether.
In practice the precise terms of a stare decisis agreement must
be implicit rather than explicit. It is sheer folly to believe that
judges actually meet, agree on what will be considered excessive
defection, and prescribe an appropriate punishment to enforce
their agreement. Their interactions are probably more volatile in
practice than the model predicts as a result of the uncertainty asso-
ciated with implicit agreement. Nevertheless, judges often accord
less respect to the opinions of their renegade colleagues, and regu-
larly express disapproval of those judges who ignore or reject
precedents. In short, judges clearly can and do take measures to
preserve stare decisis, and although their enforcement is often im-
perfect, judges seem to be more constrained by their colleagues
than by external pressures to respect precedents.
The model also implicitly predicts that stare decisis will have less
force in courts with many judges than it will in courts with fewer
judges. The judges' interaction closely resembles cartel behavior
because, like cartel members, the judges are attempting to enforce
an agreement over a long period of time without the benefit of
75 The Levy case, discussed supra note 73, is one example.
76 Indeed, an appellate judge generally must give great deference to the trial
court's finding of fact. See FED. 1L Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact ... shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."). See generally WRIGHT, supra note
59, at 647-51. Deference makes it easier for appellate judges to enforce horizontal
stare decisis.
77 See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (the majority finding that police search was conducted according to standardized
criteria is "flatly contradicted by the record"); Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168, 189
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court's discussion of [defendant's] claim of
prosecutorial misconduct is noteworthy for its omissions.").
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legal recourse. Cartels are commonly understood to have an opti-
mal membership size, beyond which effective collusion becomes
much harder to maintain. The same is likely to be true for judges:
it may be harder to monitor the decision-making behavior of many
judges than it is to monitor the behavior of only a few. Moreover,
perhaps the likelihood of inadvertent conflicts is greater within a
court with more judges.78 If, in fact, stare decisis does tend to be
weaker in large courts, then the cartel view of stare decisis may be a
richer analytic tool. Empirical research on this phenomenon
would therefore be useful.79
C. Other Predicted Features of Judicial Decision-making
One interesting prediction of the model is that where prece-
dents are not being followed, the panel's desire to circumvent the
precedent is only one possible explanation for why the precedent
was not followed. Perhaps the precedent was violated because this
panel is punishing its author for failing to adhere to stare decisis
previously. Under this explanation, the precedent is being violated
in an effort to strengthen stare decisis rather than weaken it.
The model also predicts that the constraining ability of some
of a judge's precedents will tend to wane as he approaches retire-
ment. Thus, we would expect an increase in the narrowing or over-
turning of precedents when the replacement of an appellate judge
represents a shift in the balance of normative views within the cir-
cuit. If representation of the judge's views retire with him, his pre-
cedent would certainly be replaced.80 In addition, the model also
78 See Edward M. Wise, The Legal Culture of Troglodytes: Conflicts Between Panels of the
Court of Appeals, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 313, 316-17 (1991) (inter-panel conflicts more likely
on larger appellate courts).
79 Many believe that the Ninth Circuit, because of its large size, produces a dispro-
portionate number of inconsistent decisions:
The Ninth Circuit extends over nine states and two territories, and gen-
erates almost one-sixth of all appeals in the twelve regional circuits. In a
single year, the court of appeals will adjudicate nearly 2,500 cases and
will publish as many as 900 precedential opinions. The decisions are
made by twenty-five active judges, ten senior judges, and a long parade
of visiting judges-almost invariably sitting in panels of three. The
court of appeals has embarked on an ambitious program to maintain
consistency in its decisions, but among lawyers and district judges, the
perception is widespread that inconsistency remains a major problem.
Hellman, supra note 70, at 543 (footnotes omitted). While Hellman attempted to
determine the prevalence of intracircuit conflict in the Ninth Circuit, he did not com-
pare the frequency of conflict in it with the frequency found in smaller circuits.
80 This prediction appears to comport with reality. Cf. Douglas, supra note 3, at
736 ("When only one new judge is appointed during a short period, the unsettling
effect in constitutional law may not be great. But when a majority of the Court is
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predicts increased litigation as this change approaches. Empirical
research on this phenomenon is also recommended.
One might wonder, then, why courts ever cite very old prece-
dents in their opinions. If stare decisis is really an effort by judges to
avoid punishment by convincing each other that they are not vio-
lating their colleagues' precedents, why do they continue to cite
opinions by judges who are not their colleagues? My view is that
they are providing information: they are communicating to other
judges, and to the society, that they embrace not only the views of
their colleagues, but also the views expressed in earlier opinions.
Consistent with the model, however, judges cite recent opinions by
colleagues much more often than they cite older opinions."1
CONCLUSION
Although stare decisis is traditionally viewed as a rule that soci-
ety places on judges in an effort to constrain an often politically
unaccountable institution, it is more likely that stare decisis will exist
even if society is indifferent to whether judges respect precedent.
Judges will adopt stare decisis because it is in their interests to do so,
for each judge can protect his net ability to impose his normative
views on society while eliminating the docket congestion which re-
sults from nonproductive competition among the judges. In addi-
tion, while external agents can enforce stare decisis, the judges
possess some ability to enforce adherence to their precedents even
without external constraints. In an important sense, then, the
reams of paper spent defending and criticizing stare decisis on the
ground that on net it is either socially beneficial or deleterious
have missed the point. Stare decisis exists to some extent because
the judges are better off with it. Whether we approve or disap-
prove is largely irrelevant, unless we alter the incentives faced by
judges through institutional reform.
suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be substantial unsetflement."); Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restrain 47 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 281, 284 (1990) ("In
its long history, the presence on the Court of even a single new member often brings
change.").
81 See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 254 n.9 (average age of cited court of
appeals cases is 5.8 years, and oldest court of appeals decision in 261-citation sample
was 50 years old).
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